Terms of Trade

Terms of Trade

An important concept in international trade theory is the concept of “terms of trade.” This refers to the amount of exports needed to obtain a given amount of imports, with the fewer amount of exports needed the better for the country. The terms of trade can shift, either benefiting a country or reducing its welfare.

Assume that the United States exports aircraft to Japan and imports televisions, and that one airplane can purchase 1,000 televisions. If one airplane now can purchase 2,000 televisions, the United States will be better off; alternatively, its welfare is diminished if it can only purchase 500 televisions with a single airplane.

A number of factors can affect the terms of trade, including changes in demand or supply, or government policy. In the example given just above, if Japanese demand for aircraft increases, the terms of trade will shift in the United States’ favor because it can demand more televisions for each airplane.  Alternatively, if the Japanese begin producing aircraft, the terms of trade will shift in Japan’s favor, because the supply of aircraft will now be larger and the Japanese will have alternative sources of supply.

Under certain conditions, improvements in a country’s productivity can worsen its terms of trade. For example, if Japanese manufacturers of televisions become more efficient and reduce sale prices, Japan’s terms of trade will worsen as it will take more televisions to exchange for the airplane.

A country can also adopt a beggar-thy-neighbor stance by deliberately turning the terms of trade in its favor through the imposition of an optimum tariff or through currency manipulation. In his economics textbook, Dominick Salvatore defines an optimum tariff as

that rate of tariff that maximizes the net benefit resulting from the improvement in the nation’s terms of trade against the negative effect resulting from reduction in the volume of trade. . . . As the terms of trade of the nation imposing the tariff improve, those of the trade partner deteriorate, since they are the inverse. . . . Facing both a lower volume of trade and deteriorating terms of trade, the trade partner’s welfare definitely declines. As a result, the trade partner is likely to retaliate. Note that even when the trade partner does not retaliate when one nation imposes the optimum tariff, the gains of the tariff-imposing nation are less than the losses of the trade partner, so that the world as a whole is worse off than under free trade. It is in this sense that free trade maximizes world welfare